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Abstract: The absolute king as a god-like ruler is a notorious exception to
Aristotle’s political paradigm of ruling and being ruled in turn. Since the idea
appears several times in the Politics, it must bear some philosophical impor-
tance. In elucidating the latter, I will make two claims: first, this importance
can only be grasped by referring to Plato, and especially his Statesman.
Second, the philosophical point of these passages within Aristotle’s Politics
is to indicate that such a kingly regime is not primarily better than, but
different from a political one.
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I
One of the central themes in Aristotle’s Politics is the question who should rule
the city-state and in what manner. In short, the answer is that these people
should be citizens and that their rule should be political. First, they should be
citizens, because a citizen is thought to be someone who has the right to
participate in the deliberative and decisive offices of the polis (1275a22-23 and
1275b17-21). According to Aristotle, only free and adult males (with citizen par-
ents) qualify for citizenship, which means that all slaves, women and children
are excluded from it. Second, because the citizens constitute the polis as a
political community, the rule in this community should be “political rule”
(πολιτικὴ ἀρχή), which is defined as the authority over free and equal or similar
persons (1255b20 and 1277b7-9). This rule thus can be considered as power of
peers, distinct from the despotic rule of a master over his slaves, who are not free,
and the household rule of a man over his wife and children, who are free but not
equal to their husband and father.1 As a consequence, the citizens of a political
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1 In Politics I.13 (1260a9-14), Aristotle indicates why slaves, women and children cannot partake
in political power: slaves are lacking the deliberative capacity necessary in the political
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community should be able to rule their fellow citizens as well as to be ruled by
them. This is indicated throughout the Politics as the ability in both “ruling and
being ruled” (ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι). Who these citizens are and what is meant
with their political rule depends on the nature of the constitution they live in. For
in different constitutions, various criteria can be applied for citizenship and the
idea of ruling and being ruled can even be explained in dissimilar ways.2
In spite of the differences between the various constitutions, Aristotle yet has
a general idea of political rule, in accordance with fourth century Greek practice,
that covers two main features, namely (1) that power must be shared among the
citizens and (2) that laws should be sovereign over them. The first point can
be inferred from the fact that the political community, whatever the criterion for
citizenship, consists of equal and similar persons, wherefore the political
offices are not to be held permanently by the same men, but by each “in turn”
(κατὰ μέρος or ἐν μέρει, 1261b3-4, 1279a10-11, 1297a4, 1325b8 and 1332b26). The
second point is the case because the rulers should not have the highest authority,
since they could be subject to their passions (1281a34-36 and 1286a16-20). That is
why general and incorruptible principles as laws must rule sovereignly. The
citizens should act as guardians of these laws and only take independent
decisions when the laws fall short (1282b1-6 and 1287a18-23). The general idea
in Aristotle’s Politics concerning the rule in a political community is thus that the
power of the citizens in the polis is limited, because it is not permanently in the
same hands and subjected to the laws. There is one notorious exception, how-
ever, in which Aristotle argues that this should not be the case:
P1 εἰ δέ τίς ἔστιν εἷς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολὴν ἢ πλείους μὲν ἑνός, μὴ
μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων
ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ’
εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι
decision-making process, whereas women and children do have it, but respectively in a non-
authoritative and incomplete way. This is why, according to III.6 (1278b32-1279a2), slaves
should be ruled despotically, i. e. primarily in the advantage of the master, and women and
children in the way of household management, i. e. in their own or at least a common
advantage. For these and further differences between rulers and ruled, see Miller (2013).
2 Without going into detail, the Politics instructs that in a democracy free birth as such can be
enough for citizenship, whereas in an oligarchy or an aristocracy wealth and (full) virtue limit
the citizen body. In a polity, only the military virtue seems needed. The idea of ruling and being
ruled is sometimes described in the historical way, as was customary in ancient Athens, where
the membership of various offices changes every year (1261a32-34 and 1317b24-25). At other
instances, however, Aristotle is using it in a more aristocratic way in saying that the young
citizens should be ruled by the older ones and only become rulers when they acquire a certain
age (1277b11-13 and 1332b38-41). See also Schofield (1999, 103–109).
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τῶν ἴσων ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ’ ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν
ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ
γάρ εἰσι νόμος (1284a3-14).
If there is one person so outstanding by his excess of virtue – or a number of persons,
though not enough to provide a full complement for the city – that the virtue of all the
others and their political capacity is not commensurable with their own (if there are a
number) or his alone (if there is one), such persons can no longer be regarded as a part of
the city. For they will be done injustice if it is claimed they merit equal things in spite of
being so unequal in virtue and political capacity; for such a person would likely be like a
god among human beings. From this it is clear that legislation must necessarily have to do
with those who are equal both in stock and capacity, and that for the other sort of person
there is no law – they themselves are law.3
In this famous passage from III.13, Aristotle mentions one or a few individuals
who are in excellence or virtue so outstandingly superior that any comparison
with the other citizens is excluded. In such a situation you could speak of a “god
among human beings” (θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις) who should earn all the power in the
community permanently and stand above all law. In a twofold respect, the rule
of such a god-like individual would thus be contrary to the concept of political
rule. Not remarkably, this can be presented as a problem in the Politics, because
it counters one of its general doctrines.4 The issue is well-known in the literature
and many scholars have given an explanation for the occurrence of this idea, by
pointing either to Aristotle’s relation with the Macedonian royal house (as
biographical explanation) or Plato’s political thought (as philosophical explana-
tion). The question whether this idea can be understood as a reference or
allusion to the Macedonian kings, and Alexander the Great in particular, cannot
be dealt with here. In the past, however, it is already demonstrated that a
biographical explanation is certainly not necessary.5 We will therefore only
look for an explanation that elucidates the concept from within rather than
outside Aristotle’s philosophy, without losing sight of the strong connection
with his master’s ideas. But so far, no one seems to read Aristotle’s idea of a
god-like ruler entirely in reference to his distinction of the different types of rule.
If one does so, as I will read it, it can be understood as the illustration of an
important claim in the Politics, by which Aristotle dissociates himself from Plato.
3 Translations from the Politics are taken from Lord (1984).
4 See the general discussion of this issue (“The Kingship Problem”) in Mayhew (2009, 535–538).
A more thorough treatment is given in Newell (1987, 159–178), Carlier (1993, 103–118) and
Gastaldi (2009, 33–52).
5 See Ehrenberg (1938, 71–85) and Schütrumpf (1991, II. 517–534).
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To start with, it is significant to highlight the fact that Aristotle does not seem to
mention this idea of the god-like ruler only once, but in several passages, five in
sum. I will then, first, demonstrate how these passages all refer to the same idea,
which indicates that it must bear some importance in the Politics (Section II). I will
argue next that Aristotle is dealing with an issue taken up by Plato on the best or
ideal state, but also indicate that his answer must differ in a considerable way from
hismaster’s in order to remain important (Section III). In that respect, the analysis of
P.A. Vander Waerdt serves as a methodological example here. It nevertheless falls
short as a sufficient explanation, because it does not seem to fit the text entirely
(Section IV). I will propose an alternative then, which states that Aristotle’s point
here is not that the rule of a god-like individual is better than, but different from
political rule. Although such an explanation does not seem to be free from difficul-
ties either, I believe it serves as the best solution to clarify the role of the respective
passages in the Politics on the god-like ruler (Section V).
II
Aristotle does not only mention the idea of a permanent ruler in the passage
from Politics III.13 ( =P1) cited above, but once more in the same chapter ( =P2),
and further in III.17 ( =P3), VII.3 ( =P4) and VII.14 ( =P5). It is important to look
first to these different passages from the third and seventh book, not only to
examine whether they all express the same idea or not, but also to understand
the idea(s) more fully. I will argue that these five passages do express the same
idea, by taking the first passage as a starting point, with which the other
passages will be compared and assimilated one after another.
P2 ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν
ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ’
ἀρετήν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδ’ ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν
μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ
πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλεῖς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν (1284b25-34).
In the case of the best regime, however, there is considerable question as to what ought to
be done if there happens to be someone who is outstanding not on the basis of preemi-
nence in the other goods such as strength, wealth, or abundance of friends, but on the
basis of virtue. For surely no one would assert that such a person should be expelled and
banished. But neither would they assert that there should be rule over such a person: this
is almost as if they should claim to merit ruling over Zeus by splitting the offices. What
remains – and it seems the natural course – is for everyone to obey such a person gladly,
so that persons of this sort will be permanent kings in their cities.
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P3 ὅταν οὖν ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ’
ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον, ὥσθ’ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ
γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. […] οὐ γὰρ
πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο
συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος
τοῦτον ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς (1288a15-29).
Now when it happens that a whole family, or even some one person among the rest, is so
outstanding in virtue that this virtue ismore preeminent than that of all the rest, it is just in that
case that the family be a kingly one and have authority over all matters, or that this one person
be a king. […] It does not accord with nature for the part to be preeminent over the whole, but
this is the result in the case of someone having such superiority. So all that remains is for a
person of this sort to be obeyed, and to have authority simply and not by turns.
P4 διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ᾖ κρείττων κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων,
τούτῳ καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ’ οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ
δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ’ ἣν ἔσται πρακτικός (1325b10-14).
Hence when another person is superior on the basis of virtue and of the power that acts [to
achieve] the best things, it is noble to follow this person and just to obey him. Not only
virtue should be present but also power, on the basis of which he will be active.
P5 εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες ἅτεροι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ
τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν
ἔχοντες ὑπερβολήν, εἶτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν
ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν
ἄρχειν τοὺς δ’ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ (1332b16-23).
Now if the ones were as different from the others as we believe gods and heroes differ from
human beings – much exceeding them in the first place in body, and then in soul, so that the
preeminence of the rulers is indisputable and evident to the ruled – it is clear that it would
always be better for the same persons to rule and the same to be ruled once and for all.
Let us start with the two passages from III.13, which will henceforward be
referred to as P1 and P2. In this chapter, Aristotle deals with the different claims
to power in a polis. In short, the argument is that none of the claims to exclude a
multitude from political power (such as wealth or virtue) is justified, because the
multitude is considered better, not individually, but taken together as a group.
This is not true, however, when a god-like ruler would appear, because his
virtue and capacity are “not comparable” (μὴ συμβλητή) with the abilities of all
the others, as P1 indicates.6 This is why, Aristotle goes further, ostracism is used
6 There is controversy on what exactly “not comparable” means. Some scholars take it to be
that it must be understood in a distributive way as incomparable to all the other citizens
combined, whereas others think that it must be read collectively as incomparable to the other
citizens in kind. See especially Mulgan (1974, 66–69), who endorses the second claim. It seems
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as an advantageous and even just mean to make sure that no one claims the
permanent authority over the others, except again when this person would be
preeminent in virtue, which is the reason to bring up P2 and conclude the
chapter with it. Aristotle is thus making a twofold but connected point on one
and the same idea. This can be inferred from the fact that in both cases he
considers such rule as an instance of the “best constitution” (ἀρίστη πολιτεία,
1284a1-2 and 1284b25) and compares the ruler fitted for it with a divine figure (a
θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις in 1284a10-11 and Zeus in 1284b31).
On two points, though, there seems to be at least an apparent difference
between the two passages, namely with regard to (1) the nature and (2) the
quantity of these rulers. First, more abilities for god-like rule are required in P1
(both ἀρετή and πολιτικὴ δύναμις) than in P2 (only ἀρετή). This is not really a
difference, however, since the political capacity mentioned in P1 must be under-
stood as the intellectual ability to deliberate, called “prudence” (φρόνησις).7
Since, according to the Nicomachean Ethics (1144b30-32), moral virtue implies
prudence, it does not appear necessary to mention it every time, as seems
already the case in P1 (1284a4). Moreover, prudence in the Nicomachean Ethics
(1103a3-7) is thought to be a specific intellectual virtue, and thus a virtue as well.
Prudence must therefore be considered as a necessary part of the outstanding
virtue of the god-like ruler.8 Second, Aristotle mentions in P2 only the case of
one god-like ruler, while in P1 he leaves open the possibility of several such
individuals. Nevertheless, already in P1 is the tendency detectable to apply the
idea only on one ruler, since Aristotle uses just the singular τὸν τοιοῦτον in
1284a11. It therefore makes sense that Aristotle understands these god-like rulers
as “kings” (βασιλεῖς) in P2 and elsewhere, and not as aristocrats.9 There is thus
no doubt that the two passages from III.13 express the same idea.
safe to say, however, that both interpretations do not exclude each other, in the sense that
incomparable things are not “measured by the same standard”, but at the same time “need not
preclude all comparisons”, see Keyt (1991, 275).
7 In Politics III.4 (1277a15), Aristotle clearly indicates that the excellent ruler is “good and
prudent” (ἁγαθὸς καὶ φρόνιμος), referring both to the moral and the intellectual excellence of
his nature. That prudence is a “political capacity” is clear from the sixth book of the
Nicomachean Ethics, where both prudence and the political domain are equated (1141b23-24)
and prudence is thought a capacity (1143a25-29). Cf. Newell (1987, 165).
8 For this and a more thorough discussion, see Bates (2003, 199–205).
9 According to Aristotle’s famous classification in III.7 (1279a25-38 and 1279b4-10), a kingship is
a correct regime where there is only one ruler, whereas in an aristocracy the rule is divided
among few. But in both cases, the rulers rule with a view to the common advantage. If this was
not the case, they would be deviant regimes, called tyranny or oligarchy respectively.
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The third passage appears a few chapters later in the third book, in III.17. At
first sight, there seems to be a gap between P3 and the first two passages. The
passages from III.13 are nevertheless used as introduction to Aristotle’s discus-
sion on kingship in Politics III.14-17 and especially his evaluation herein of an
absolute kingship or “all-kingship” (παμβασιλεία), which is a regime with a
permanent ruler who is sovereign over all (1285b29-30) and acts according to
his own will (1287a8-10). Aristotle discusses this regime at length and only
seems to consider it justified in the case of a divine ruler with the abilities of
the god-like king.10 And this is exactly what he is saying in P3. Not only is he
making an explicit reference to the former two passages (to P1 in 1288a19 and to
P2 in 1288a24), he is also using the same vocabulary both to describe the
preeminent but different nature of the god-like king in reference to the others
(ὑπερβολή or ὑπεροχή and διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετήν in 1284a4, 1284b27-28 and
1288a16-17) and to indicate how the latter should act when such a person would
appear (πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ in 1284b32 and 1288a28-29).
What is new in P3, though, is that Aristotle speaks of an individual or a
“whole family” (γένος ὅλον) and thus connects the outstanding superiority
needed for god-like kingship also with kinship.11 This could mean either that
this family is a reference to the various individuals from P1, or that it just points
to the heredity of the kingship. Although the first possibility seems to have the
advantage that it does not need to create a difference between the various
individuals from P1 and the family from P3, the second possibility has the
benefit that it fits Aristotle’s general definition of kingship (1279a32-34) better
as the good rule of (only) one man. Although both interpretations are not
mutually exclusive, the last one seems to be the one used here, since it corre-
sponds better with what Aristotle says elsewhere in the Politics on family and
kingship.12 This does not mean that the various individuals from P1 cannot be
10 The relation between the god-like kingship and the παμβασιλεία is thus, strictly speaking,
that the former implies the latter, but not vice versa. To earn the name “all-kingship” truly,
however, a permanent ruler who isn’t subjected to the laws must already be divine. For similar
older terms (παμβασιλεύς or παμβασίλεια) also seem to have a divine connotation in Alcaeus
(Diehl fr. 2) and Aristophanes (Clouds, 357), see Carlier (1993, 108).
11 This corresponds to what he says in III.13 (1383a36-37), where he mentions the argument that
it would be likely that better men descend from better parents, since “noble birth” (εὐγένεια) is
the “virtue of a family” (ἀρετὴ γένους). Something similar can be found in the fragment (Rose
fr. 92) from Aristotle’s lost treatise On noble birth. In Politics III.15 (1286b22-27) and Rhetoric II.15
(1390b21-31), he nevertheless criticizes such a view.
12 In III.14 (1285a16) and V.10 (1313a10), Aristotle uses the expression “based on family” (κατὰ
γένος) to indicate hereditary kingship. Earlier in V.10 (1310b9-12 and 1310b31-34), he also
mentions that kingship is based on the preeminence in virtue of an individual or his family,
referring thus to the same two possibilities as in P3.
Aristotle’s Politics 521
Brought to you by | KU Leuven University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/26/16 2:52 PM
called kings, since Aristotle himself sometimes uses the word in the plural for
multiple but permanent rulers within the same state.13 It is thus uncontroversial
that all the three passages from the third book refer to the same idea.
This could become more difficult when one looks to the fourth passage, the
one from VII.3, since now, there are not only a few chapters between this one
and the former ones, but three whole books. The problem could disappear if one
would insert books VII-VIII of the Politics between book III and IV, as various
scholars thought necessary.14 But regardless of the correct or most adequate
order of the books from the Politics, it seems clear that at least thematically
speaking, there is no difference between the passages from the third and the
seventh book, in so far as both are embedded in the question concerning the
best constitution, and not, as the empirical books IV-VI, with practical questions
concerning the decline or preservation of historically attested constitutions.
Nevertheless, one could argue for a difference between the three passages
from the third book and P4, because Aristotle mentions that the individual in
the latter passage is only “superior” (κρείττων, in 1325b10), and thus not so
outstandingly superior that his virtue and political capacity would be incompar-
able with the abilities of others.15 The problem with such an interpretation is that
it would lose sight of two correspondences with the former three passages. First,
the same two abilities, virtue ánd capacity, are expected again from the ruler in
P4 as from the god-like king in P1 (1284a6-7 and 10).16 Second, it is mentioned
here that it would be just to “obey him” (τούτῳ πείθεσθαι), as was also the case
in P2 (1284b32) and P3 (1288a28-29). It seems then that P4 is far more likely to be
an expression of the same idea as in the former passages from the third book
and that, although Aristotle does not mention it explicitly, the ὑπερβολή or
ὑπεροχή of the ruler’s virtue is implied here as well.
A similar difference between the passages from the third book and the last
passage, the one from VII.14, can be sought, but now with a result that would be
the reverse. For instance, Richard Kraut argues that P5 differs from the passages
from the third book, since the former is “beyond utopia” in so far that the
subjects of the rulers herein are all thought to be well-educated and virtuous
13 This is the case in II.9 (1271a18-26) and 11 (1272b37-41), where he mentions the kings of
Sparta and Carthage. Cf. Keyt (1991, 274).
14 See the still widely used commentary of Newman (1887–1902). For a more recent plea for
such an adjustment to the manuscript tradition, see Simpson (1998, xvi–xx).
15 See Schütrumpf (2005, IV. 279).
16 In P4 (1325b11), Aristotle does not speak of a “political capacity”, but of a “practical
capacity” (δύναμις πρακτική) to achieve the best things. That the latter is also a reference to
φρόνησις is made clear in the Nicomachean Ethics (1140b20-21 or 1141b21), where the practical
character of prudence is always emphasized.
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men, whereas the ones in the third book are not necessarily so.17 This would
imply that the virtue of the kings in P5 even must be higher than the already
preeminent virtue mentioned in P1. In a way, this is plausible, since P5 also
mentions a bodily superiority (1332b18-19) that is lacking in the other passages.
Nevertheless, the preeminence of the soul, with which virtue is meant, seems
more important and thus more constitutive for god-like kingship.18 It may be
true, as R.G. Mulgan argued, that the needed virtue for a permanent ruler as such
is only relative to the virtue of his subjects.19 It is unlikely, however, that Aristotle
used the idea on permanent rule in P5 in a different way than in the former
passages, since the reference to the divine (or even mere heroic) character of
these rulers and the vocabulary used to describe it (διαφέροντες or διαφέρειν and
ὑπερβολή or ὑπεροχή) do not suggest any difference with the already outstanding
men from the other passages. We may therefore conclude that all the five
passages wherein Aristotle describes a ruler who is superior to his subjects, are
expressions of the same idea: a god-like king so outstanding in virtue, both
morally and intellectually, that he should rule permanently without any laws.
III
As the idea of a god-like king seems to be an important point in Aristotle’s
Politics, at least important enough to mention it in five different passages, this
requires an explanation.20 Such an explanation has to do two things: (1) it should
elucidate the importance of the idea of a god-like king by clarifying why Aristotle
uses it, (2) without losing sight of the fact that it remains an exception to the
more general doctrine of ruling and being ruled in turn. The problem is that it
should contain a justification for the passages on god-like kingship that seems at
first sight lacking in the Politics. Of course, one could argue with David Keyt, and
17 See Kraut (2002, 421).
18 Compare it with I.5 (1254b34-1255a1), where Aristotle mentions something similar, but
emphasizes more clearly the psychological superiority. In III.12 (1282b23-30) he even criticizes
the division of power on the basis of just physical features as complexion or height.
19 See Mulgan (1974, 25).
20 In looking for an explanation, we cannot accept the solution that all these passages only
contain an argument to the absurd, because that would annihilates the importance of the idea
expressed in it. (Cf. Carlier (1993, 116), who indicates the same, without even taking the two
extra passages from the seventh book into consideration.) Such an interpretation is given, for
instance, by M.P. Nichols, who considers the outstanding virtue of the god-like king a “contra-
diction in terms”, because, as Aristotle argues in the Nicomachean Ethics, “virtue lies in the
mean”, see Nichols (1992, 170).
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it seems indeed right, that this must be understood as a part of Aristotle’s theory
of distributive justice.21 For in III.9, Aristotle starts dealing with the thought that
power must be distributed rightly among the citizens. In normal circumstances,
this means that citizens deserve a fair share in power according to their merit and
abilities, which supposes that they can be compared with each other within a
certain scale. When, however, the situation would occur, as in the case of the
“god among human beings” from P1, that someone’s excellence is that great that
he is no longer comparable to the others, then the principle of distributive justice
instructs that all power must be concentrated in the hands of this divine indivi-
dual. The passages on the god-like king must be taken then as an exceptional or
merely theoretical application of the theory of distributive justice.22 The problem
with such an argument is that it only justifies the idea of god-like kingship in the
Politics, but fails to explain its importance.
A solution could consist in the fact that we should not consider the Politics
as a monologue that stands on its own, but as a dialogue that in many respects
pays its debts to Plato, whose thought is indeed often taken up or refuted. This
could explain the importance of the passages on the god-like king, since the
interaction with the thought of his former master can serve as a reason why
Aristotle puts so much attention to the matter. It is interesting, as many scholars
already have pointed out, that there is indeed a correspondence between the
idea of permanent rule in Aristotle’s Politics and certain passages from Plato’s
political works, wherein the latter describes his ideal statesman. Plato’s two
main political treatises, the Republic and the Laws, come to mind first, but in
fact, it is particularly an important part of the Statesman (293a-303b) that
contains a strongly similar point of reasoning. In comparing Plato and
Aristotle, scholars have pointed to the fact that Aristotle in Politics III.15-16,
just like Plato, embeds this topic into a larger discussion concerning the ques-
tion whether it is advantageous to be ruled by the best laws or the best man.23
I want to focus only on the result of this discussion here, in so far that both
philosophers agree that a situation is at least conceivable where some indivi-
duals should be permanent rulers.
21 See Keyt (1991, 239–240 and 270–276).
22 That Aristotle does not seem to believe that such a ruler could occur in reality can be
inferred from P3 (“It does not accord with nature for the part to be preeminent over the whole”)
or the sentences following P5 in VII.14 (1332b23-27), claiming that it is not easy to assume such
superiority in an individual. This corresponds with the repeated thesis in the Politics (1252b19-
20, 1286b8-10 and 1313a3-5) that kingship in general, at least for Greeks, is a regime from the
past.
23 See especially Cohen (1996, 145–161) and Atack (2015, 309–313).
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There are three significant correspondences between Aristotle’s god-like
king and Plato’s ideal ruler, namely with regard to their (1) quantity, (2) quality
and (3) relation to the laws. First, just as Aristotle in P1, Plato mentions in the
Statesman (293a and 297c) one or a few persons who could take up this role in
the state (cf. Republic 540d). But just as Aristotle, he continues to speak of these
individuals in the singular (e. g. 294a, 296e, 300c or 301a) and therefore calls
them kings. It is thus in regard to kingship that both philosophers discuss the
idea of permanent rule. Second, Plato is describing such an outstanding person
in divine terms as well (303b; cf. Laws 713 c-d), even, as Aristotle in P5, both
with regard to their body and soul (301e). Thus this permanent ruler is also for
Plato a god-like king who differs extensively from his regular human subjects
and therefore deserves all authority. Third, like Aristotle in P1, Plato indicates
that such a person should stand above the (written) laws (294a-b or 300c-d), but
also that in regular constitutions, where such an ideal ruler is missing (301e;
Laws 875c-d), it is always better that the regime is lawful (302c-303b). This
indicates, finally, that Plato too considers laws necessary in regular circum-
stances, but not in his ideal state.24
In a way, thus, you have a similar type of reasoning in Plato’s Statesman
and Aristotle’s Politics: if there would be divine individuals who are fitted for
permanent rule, then you should give him (or they) all the power in the state.
But because in practice, these god-like individuals are not likely to occur, people
should adopt a government where laws rule and citizens share their power with
each other. It becomes tempting then to think, as scholars often did, that the
god-like king from the Politics is to be equated with Plato’s famous conception of
the ideal ruler in the Republic (473c-e): the philosopher-king.25 As such, this is
not altogether unlikely, because in his (juvenile) Protrepticus (47–49), Aristotle
indeed seems to endorse the claim that statesmen and legislators should be
philosophers. However, in the work that definitely reflects his mature political
philosophy, the Politics, no trace is to be found of such a claim.26 In III.4
(1277b25-26), Aristotle even states that the only (intellectual) virtue peculiar to
a ruler is prudence. Since the “political” or “practical capacity” from P1 and P4
are taken to be this prudence, as was argued before, this general requirement
24 One might still see a difference on this level between Plato and Aristotle, in so far that Plato
argues primarily for the ideal ruler and only in the lack of it for a lawful regime, whereas
Aristotle does the inverse and considers the lawful regime as the standard, with the god-like
king as its only exception, see Kahn (1990, 380).
25 See e. g. Lindsay (1991, 506) or Bartlett (1994, 148).
26 To be honest, neither does the Politics contain a straightforward criticism to the philosopher-
king, although Aristotle does criticize many other aspects from Plato’s Republic. His objections
to this idea, however, “can be gathered from what he says elsewhere”, see Miller (2009, 545).
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still seems to apply in the case of the god-like king. But then, these kings are not
philosophers in the Platonic sense as individuals with real “scientific knowl-
edge” (ἐπιστήμη) of an everlasting truth, but only men with an extraordinary
practical capacity, useful in politics for deliberation and decision-making.27
Such a difference between Plato and Aristotle is not necessary, because
Aristotle’s Politics is often in agreement with Plato, and sometimes even contains
phrases and concepts from the latter without referring to his works. But on this
point, a difference between both philosophers is not unlikely, and can even be
suspected, for it would make clear why Aristotle puts so much emphasis on the
idea. The fact that he mentions a certain point and then repeats it several times
could suggest that Aristotle does not entirely agree with Plato. Thus, in looking
for an explanation for Aristotle’s god-like king, one has to take into account that
Plato described his ideal rulers in a similar way, without going so far as to
identify them completely with each other. In other words, we should look for a
philosophical explanation that not only reveals the similarities between Plato
and Aristotle, but also, and maybe even primarily, one that deals with the
existing differences between both.
IV
In a paper appeared some thirty years ago, P.A. Vander Waerdt came up with a
straightforward philosophical motivation of Aristotle’s god-like kingship by
explaining how it deals with a question already present in Plato, without falling
victim to one of the weaknesses of his master’s answer.28 In short, his explana-
tion is that Aristotle thinks that this god-like kingship is better than a regular
political regime where every citizen participates in power, because it endorses in
a better way the good life that the citizens aim for. The thesis is that, ultimately,
the citizens of a political community need “leisure” (σχολή) to lead a good life,
and the participation in politics prevents them from achieving this aim.29 With
this leisure, citizens will not only engage in philosophy in the strict sense, but
27 The distinction between ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις is made in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
VI.5 (1140a31-1140b4), where he relates scientific knowledge to necessary things that cannot be
otherwise, whereas prudence as deliberative capacity does not apply to these things. Later on,
in VI.8 (1141b23-33), prudence is therefore thought to be the “leading capacity” (ἀρχιτεκτονική)
in the domain of politics. In both Plato’s Republic (428b-429a) and his Statesman (292b-e), it is
nevertheless ἐπιστήμη that is required from the ideal rulers.
28 See Vander Waerdt (1985, 249–273).
29 See especially Politics VII.14 (1333a30-1333b5 or 1334a2-10), where Aristotle ranks leisure
above “occupation” (ἀσχολία), and indicates that the latter is for the sake of the former.
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will participate in a broader intellectual culture, which includes music and other
arts as well.30 Since a god-like king would take away the required participation
in power of the citizens within a normal political regime, this kingship is thus
best suited to promote the best life in the polis. Although Aristotle understands
the best life then in a more broadened sense than Plato, he still agrees with Plato
that the unoccupied life of “philosophy” (φιλοσοφία) is the best way of life and
that kings are the best rulers to implement it.
A problem, however, is that a philosopher-king is normally not willing to
rule, because it is not in his interest to take up power in the state, since it
deprives him of the life he wants to lead. In the Republic (499b-c, 519c or 521b), it
is even argued by Socrates that such men must be compelled to rule. Aristotle
solves this issue here, according to Vander Waerdt, since the god-like kings of
whom he speaks in the Politics are not philosophers with, or at least aiming for,
scientific knowledge, but divine individuals, who have no need for contempla-
tive activities, wherefore they can grant their subjects in a beneficent way the
time and leisure to do deal with these. This is because they differ in kind from
their subjects in the sense that their virtue is not intellectual or moral, but a
“heroic virtue”, incomparable to any (regular) human virtue.31 It is only because
such individuals are highly unlikely in practice, that Aristotle doesn’t pay more
attention to them. Vander Waerdt then concludes: “Aristotle thus agrees with
Plato that the way of life of the best regime consists in the cultivation of
φιλοσοφία and that kingship is the εἶδος ἀρχῆς best suited to bring about the
necessary conditions for it, but he disagrees with Plato both in the meaning he
assigns to φιλοσοφία as the way of life of the best regime and in the kind of
virtue which constitutes the king’s incomparable virtue.”32
Vander Waerdt’s analysis already received some critique, because one of its
premises, namely that the best life in Aristotle’s Politics is to be assimilated
(exclusively) with a life of leisure, is to rigid and does not pay its debts to
Aristotle’s overall validation of political participation.33 It remains generally
accepted though that contemplative activities are, if not sufficient, then at
30 See Lord (1982, 196–202).
31 This can be inferred from P1, P3 and P5, where Aristotle indeed emphasizes the god-like
character of these rulers. Vander Waerdt additionally also points to Nicomachean Ethics VII.1
(1145a18-24), where Aristotle speaks of such a superhuman excellence that is “something heroic
and divine” (ἡρωική τινα καὶ θεία), which can only be achieved “by excess of virtue” (δι’ ἀρετῆς
ὑπερβολήν).
32 See Vander Waerdt (1985, 271).
33 For criticism of this thesis, see Miller (1995, 235–237) or Taylor (1995, 248–252). Very recently,
Carol Atack also criticized Vander Waerdt (and other scholars), arguing that he falls into the
trap of creating a model that is not present in Aristotle’s texts. According to her, Aristotle is only
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least necessary conditions for the best life in Aristotle’s philosophy. But if one
accepts this starting point, then there are good reasons to agree with Vander
Waerdt’s analysis, because it can serve as the philosophical explanation of the
many passages in the Politics on the god-like kingship. For it illustrates on what
point Aristotle still agrees with his former master and where he differs in
opinion. The latter is then the reason why it is important to bring it up in the
Politics and come back to it several times. However, when we look more closely
to these passages and the context in which they are brought up, Vander
Waerdt’s thesis can be confronted with two problems, of which the second
will be fatal: (1) Aristotle does not endorse the rule of philosophers in the
Politics, but neither does he explicitly reject it and (2) he considers the rule of
the god-like king as primarily just, and only secondary in the interest of his
subjects.
The first problem can come through as something odd, because it was
already argued that the god-like king is not a philosopher in the Platonic
sense. Nevertheless, we shouldn’t draw too much attention to the fact that
Aristotle considers his permanent ruler as someone completely different from a
philosopher-king, because strangely enough he never explicitly criticizes this
Platonic idea in the Politics. Vander Waerdt’s claim that it is yet on this point
that Aristotle’s god-like king really differs from Plato’s ideal ruler, is only
demonstrated indirectly by referring to a fragment from Themistius’ Oration
VIII (107d).34 Problematic, moreover, is that this fragment still reserves some
role for a philosopher in politics: not as the king himself, but as the adviser of
the king. Although his god-like kings are indeed not philosophers, it seems then
too farfetched to make it Aristotle’s point, because the Politics pays too little
attention to it.
More important is the fact that Vander Waerdt believes that the god-like
kingship is better than a political regime, because it would benefit the subjects,
exploring rather than supporting the virtue model of monarchy developed by intellectuals as
Xenophon and Isocrates, see Atack (2015, 300 and 317).
34 The fragment (Rose fr. 647), although strictly speaking it is rather a testimony, could derive
from (or: refer to) Aristotle’s On kingship or his Politicus, and reads: Πλάτων μὲν οὖν, εἰ καὶ τὰ
ἄλλα πάντα θεῖος καὶ αἰδοῖος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε ἀτεχνῶς ἀποκεκινδυνευμένως προήκατο λόγον,
ὅτι μὴ πρότερον τὰ κακὰ λήξει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὶν ἂν ἢ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἢ βασιλεῖς
φιλοσοφήσωσιν. ἐλήλεγκται δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ δέδωκεν εὐθύνας τῷ χρόνῳ. ἄγασθαι δὲ ἄξιον
Ἀριστοτέλην, ὅτι μικρὸν τὰ Πλάτωνος ῥήματα μεταθεὶς τὸν λόγον πεποίηκεν ἀληθέστερον,
φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ οὐχ ὅπως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φάσκων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμποδών, τὸ δὲ
φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀληθινῶς ἐντυγχάνειν εὐπειθῆ καὶ εὐήκοον· ἔργων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὴν βασιλείαν
ἐνέπλησεν, οὐχὶ ῥημάτων.
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because it is in their interest. In the five passages, Aristotle nevertheless men-
tions only in P5 that such a regime would be “better” (βέλτιον, 1332b22) than one
where everyone rules in turn, and even here it does not necessary imply a
hierarchy of ways of ruling. Compare it with a remark in II.2 (1261a38-39),
where he also says that “it is clear that it is better if the same always rule”
(δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βέλτιον ἄρχειν), since it would be better for shoe-
makers and carpenters to stick with their profession rather than change places
every once and a while. But then Aristotle continues: “[B]ut in cases where it is
not possible because all are equal in their nature, and where it is at the same
time just for all to have a share in ruling (regardless of whether ruling is
something good or something mean), there is at least an imitation of this” (ἐν
οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτ’
ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, ἐν τούτοις γε τοῦτο
μιμεῖται, 1261a39-1261b3, cf. 1332b23-29). It is thus only with regard to the nature
of the rulers that Aristotle presents permanent rule as better than ruling and
being ruled in turn, because people are simply entitled to that which corre-
sponds to their nature. When, however, this is not possible nor just, as in a
political community, then such a situation should be imitated as good as
possible, by giving everyone who deserves so at least a partial or temporary
share in government. But this does not imply that the regime of a god-like king
an sich is better than political rule, nor that it is supposed to be due to the
enviable position of the subjects. Indeed, Aristotle never says that the perma-
nent rule of a god-like king would be essentially in the interest of his subjects.35
Even at the contrary, in P3 and P4 he puts the emphasis, as in the cited passage
from II.2, on the fact that it would be only “just” (δίκαιος, 1288a18 and 1325b12)
for these highly excellent individuals to rule permanently, thus for their sake.
If there would occur a situation where one or a few individuals are in virtue and
ability in a non-comparative way better fitted as rulers, then it would be simply
unjust to deny them all the power, as he mentions already in P1 (ἀδικήσονται,
1284a9). It seems then that we should look for an alternative explanation that
fits the text better than Vander Waerdt’s analysis.
35 Of course, the regime of the god-like king also must be in the interest of his subjects,
otherwise it wouldn’t be a rightful kingship (1279a17-20 and 32–34) and the subjects wouldn’t
gladly obey these kings (1284b32-34). One can even argue further that kingship, according to
Aristotle, always implies beneficence or “well-doing” (εὐεργεσία), see Politics V.10 (1310b31-34)
or Nicomachean Ethics VIII.10-11 (1160b2-6 and 1161a11-15). I do not argue against this, but
rather that this is not primarily Aristotle’s point, because he never says so in discussing the god-
like kingship.
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VIn the meantime, other scholars have dealt with the issue of the god-like king as
well. Whether they all agree (completely) with Vander Waerdt’s thesis is less
important, but what seems to be a common assumption in understanding these
passages is that Aristotle argues that this absolute kingship of a god-like
individual would be an ideal that is ranked higher than a lawful regime where
power is shared among the citizens. One does not, however, need to assume that
a regime with permanent rule as such is better than one with ruling and being
ruled. It is both true that the god-like kingship is (1) not a regime with political
rule and (2) presented as an instantiation of the best constitution, but these two
premises do not lead to the conclusion that every instantiation of the best
constitution is not a regime with political rule.36 The only valid conclusion
would be that some instantiations of the best constitution are not regimes with
political rule. But this leaves open the possibility that others are instantiations of
the best constitution and I think that an aristocracy can fulfil this role.
In Aristotle’s classical sixfold model of constitutions, as presented in Politics
III.7, kingship, aristocracy and polity are thought to be correct constitutions,
because they look towards “the common advantage” (τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον),
rather than merely the advantage of the one, few or many rulers, as in a tyranny,
oligarchy or democracy. But a further difference between kingship (as right rule
by one) and aristocracy (as right rule by few) on the one hand and polity (as
right rule by many) on the other, is that the degree of virtue of the rulers in the
former two regimes can be thought to reach a complete level of excellence,
whereas in the latter they cannot: “It is possible for one or a few to be out-
standing in virtue, but where more are concerned it is difficult for them to be
proficient with a view to virtue as a whole” (ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἢ
ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ’ ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν,
1279a39-1279b1). As the expression διαφέρειν κατ’ ἀρετήν reminds us of the
main reason in P1 and P2 why a god-like king earns all the power in a state,
it seems thus that the same applies to an aristocracy.37 Aristotle here simply
follows Plato’s Republic (445d) and Statesman (293a), in saying that the ideal
regime can be both a kingship (rule by one) or an aristocracy (rule by few).
36 Otherwise, in syllogistic terms, the Latius Hos-rule would be violated, for the quantity of one
of the terms (‘being an instantiation of the best regime’) cannot be higher in the conclusion than
in one of the premises.
37 In a god-like kingship, however, the outstanding virtue must contain also a certain “excess”
(ὑπερβολή) or “preeminence” (ὑπεροχή), which makes the king incomparable to all others.
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If this is true, then it is not remarkable that kingship and aristocracy are
mentioned together by Aristotle as the two regimes where this (high) degree of
virtue is imaginable (1289a30-35 and 1310b30-34). The difference, however, is that
in an aristocracy, you could still speak of a citizen community, although certainly
smaller than the one from a polity, whereas in a kingship, this is no longer the case.
For in an aristocracy, the (select) group of citizens can still share its power among its
participants, but in a kingship, the only and thus permanent ruler remains the king.
In that respect, it makes sense that Aristotle states in III.13 that with regard to the
best constitution, a citizen is “onewho is capable of and intentionally chooses being
ruled and ruling with a view to the life in accordance with virtue” (ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ
προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετήν, 1284a2-3), which
seems to describe the life in an aristocracy. And only hereafter, he adds the
exception of permanent rule, which is P1. Similarly, but now more pronounced,
the conclusion of the third book of the Politics reads:
φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν
συστήσειεν ἄν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην, ὥστ’ ἔσται καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη
ταὐτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν
(1288a39-1288b2).
[I]t is evident that it is in the same manner and through the same things that a man
becomes excellent and that one might constitute a city under an aristocracy or a kingship.
So the education and the habits that make a man excellent are essentially the same as
those that make him a political or kingly [ruler].
Aristocracy and kingship are here both thought to be instantiations of the best
regime, but only the rule of the former is called “political” (πολιτικός). It seems
fair to understand aristocracy and kingship then as the two types of constitu-
tions that qualify for the best regime in Aristotle’s political thought, but that the
rule of the former is to be called political, whereas the latter is not.
If, therefore, one is looking for a philosophical explanation that illuminates
why Aristotle puts so much emphasis in the Politics on the idea of a god-like king,
one does not need to explain why it is better than an aristocracy, but rather why it is
different. The answer then seems simple: the rule of a god-like king is no longer
political rule. As such, this does not seem to be an important point, but it is in fact
one of the main aims from the outset of the Politics (1252a7-16, and again in 1253b18-
20 and 1254b2-6) to differentiate between despotic, household, kingly, and political
rule, by which Aristotle dissociates himself from Plato.38 For Plato states in his
Statesman (258e and 259c) that the rule of a master, a household manager, a king,
38 This can be considered even as the main aim of book one, see Schofield (1999, 128–132) and
Cherry (2012, 29–36).
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and a statesman (or politician) are all instantiations of the same art or science, but
Aristotle disagrees and indicates that these are different forms of authority.39 In the
first book of the Politics he deals with despotic rule over slaves (chapters 4–7) and
the spousal and paternal rule over wife and children (chapters 12–13), but for his
treatment of kingly rule, one has to wait until the third book.40 If that is true, why
not read the passages on the god-like kingship then as illustrations whose aim it is
exactly to point to the difference between kingly and political rule?
That the rule of a god-like king is non-political, was already presented in the
introduction of this paper as something evident, but that this is exactly
Aristotle’s point is less obvious. Nevertheless, a double indication can be
found in P1, the first (and thus guiding) of the five passages on permanent
rule. First, Aristotle says that if you would suppose some one or more god-like
rulers, you shouldn’t suppose a group that large that it can “provide a full
complement for the city” (πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, 1284a4-5), because
then it would become a (new) political community that contains a group of
citizens considered equal to each other. Second, a few lines later, he adds that
such god-like individuals would no longer be considered as “part of the city”
(μέρος πόλεως, 1284a8), which is the political community.41 Within this first
39 This claim does not seem to be used in its strongest version, in the sense that all four types
of rule differ from each other, but rather in a weaker sense, that they are not all the same. The
main point seems to be that political rule differs from the other three, because only in the
former there is an alternation of power, but this does not prevent Aristotle from assimilating
sometimes the other types with each other. In Politics I.7 (1255b20) or III.14 (1285b29-33), for
instance, monarchic or kingly rule and household rule are thought to be similar, see
Schütrumpf (1991, I. 179–180).
40 At the end of the first book of the Politics (1260b20-24), Aristotle refers to the remaining
questions that he will deal with elsewhere, which probably (also) refers to his treatment of kingship
in the third book, see Cherry (2012, 35). An explanation for the scattered exposition on the different
kinds of rule in the first and third book could be the following: in the first book, Aristotle deals with
power in the oikos, in the third book (and further) with power in the polis. This is thenwhy the rule of
a master and a household manager is discussed in the former, the rule of a king and politicians in
the latter. Aristotle nevertheless also makes analogies between these forms of rule, e. g. in Politics
I.12 (1259a37-1259b4) and Nicomachean Ethics VIII.10 (1160b22-1161a9). Interesting to mention here
is that Aristotle compares the paternal rule of a father over his children in both chapters with kingly
rule, whereas the spousal rule of aman over his wife respectively with political and aristocratic rule.
That the latter two types of rule are not contrary to each other (which supportsmy claim of calling an
aristocracy a regime with political rule), is discussed in an excellent recent paper, see Deslauriers
(2015, 46–63).
41 A similar remark is given by Aristotle in Politics I.2, where he says that “who is in need of
nothing through being self-sufficient” (δεόμενος δι’ αὐτάρκειαν οὐθέν, 1253a28) is not a part of
the city either. Such a person is called a god here and a king in Nicomachean Ethics VIII.10
(1160b3-4).
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passage, Aristotle thus makes clear that, although justified, the rule of a god-like
king occurs outside a political context. It must be said, I am certainly not the
first one who notices that Aristotle is indicating here that the permanent rule of
such a king would be non-political.42 But I think that the problematic nature of
all these passages in the Politics disappears if one does not only read it this way,
but even understand it as Aristotle’s argumentative point. I take it thus to be that
Aristotle intends to say with these five passages that the rule of genuinely god-
like individuals would be indeed justified, but at the same time that it differs
from the rule to be expected in a political community, where power is shared
among the citizens.
In looking for an explanation, it was said earlier that Aristotle’s point must
be related to Plato’s thought, since the similarities with the latter cannot be
coincidental. But to understand Aristotle’s emphasis, is seems likely that his
version of this best constitution differs from the Platonic account. If you would
argue that it is indeed Aristotle’s point that such kingly rule would be different
from the political version of the best constitution, i. e. aristocracy, then an
important difference with Plato’s Statesman can and must be noted: Plato
considers (especially) kingly and political rule throughout the whole dialogue
as interchangeable.43 Since Aristotle, from the outset of the Politics, disagrees
with such an assimilation, it seems that he sincerely felt the urge to react against
it and that the passages on god-like kingship are the ones in which he does so.
The reason why Aristotle disagrees with Plato is simply that kingship would not
(any longer) be a regime that fits Aristotle’s idea of a polis as community of
peers.44 One has to suppose an almost divine individual to make his rule
justified, but even then it does not happen without consequences, for such a
ruler would put the polis as a political community to an end, by being, strictly
speaking, the only citizen that partakes in power. The idea of the god-like king
42 See especially Newell (1987, 170–174). More recently, the distinction between kingly and
political rule is also recognized in P1 by Laurand (2011, 81–85) and Cherry (2012, 102 and 114).
43 As Schütrumpf indicates quite neatly, the art of a king and a statesman are within Plato’s
Statesman thought to be the same (259d and 280a), they are placed often side by side (276c,
289d, 291c and 311c) and when the one is mentioned, then the other is often used as a synonym
a few lines later (277a, 287a-d, 290a, 303e-304a and 305 c-d), see Schütrumpf (1991, I. 177).
44 In the Politics, Aristotle argues at several occasions (1252b19-20, 1286b8-10 and 1313a3-5)
that kingship is a regime from the past (see also note 22). In that sense it can be understood as
prior to the political. According to Valéry Laurand, however, the rule of a god-like king differs
from this pre-political rule: “Ce roi est comme un dieu, il s’agit d’une royauté d’exception, qui
n’est plus infra-politique, ou pré-politique, mais super-politique, parce qu’il dépasse ce qu’on
trouve dans une cité, la nature des citoyens”, see Laurand (2011, 85). This may be true indeed,
but does not inhibit that god-like kingship remains non-political.
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in Aristotle’s Politics can be thought to function as the illustration of this
consequence.
I want to conclude this paper with two apparent difficulties with this
proposed explanation of the five passages on permanent rule: (1) Aristotle
somehow still considers such a kingship “political” and (2) he argues two
times that kingship is indeed better than aristocracy. The first problem with
the above explanation that kingly rule essentially differs from political rule, is
that Aristotle is then certainly not consistent in saying that god-like kingship is
in every respect non-political. For already in P1 he calls the required capacity
twice “political” (πολιτική). Similarly, he says in III.17, that the people fitted for
it must be “preeminent in virtue relative to political leadership” (ὑπερέχον κατ’
ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν, 1288a9). This is not a real problem, though,
since the word πολιτική in Aristotle’s Politics can be understood in a general
sense, as the study of the human well-being, and in a narrow sense, as study of
(power in) political constitutions.45 In the argument that god-like kingship is
really different from a regime with political rule, πολιτική is thus only used in
the narrow sense as πολιτικὴ ἀρχή. This becomes clear if one reads the above
sentence from III.17 in opposition with the next one, where it is said of aristoc-
racy that such a regime acquires people “whose virtue makes them expert
leaders relative to political rule” (κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν
ἀρχήν, 1288a11-12). A kingship is then still “political” in the general sense
of political leadership, needed for the well-being of the king’s subjects, but
not anymore in the narrow sense, like an aristocracy, as (best) regime with
political rule.
The second problem seems to bear a greater challenge, because Aristotle
indicates twice that a kingship is indeed the best regime within a hierarchy of all
the six constitutions: once in Politics IV.2 (1289a38-1289b5) and once in
Nicomachean Ethics VIII.10 (1160a31-1160b9). Within this scale, kingship is
thus presented as a regime that is ranked higher than an aristocracy, which
reminds us of both the indication in P5 that such rule was “better” than ruling
and being ruled, and the explanation that Vander Waerdt came up with to
demonstrate why. I do not think, however, that one has to go that far in reading
these two passages as key points in Aristotle’s validation of the god-like king-
ship, because the (explicit) reason why kingship is best, seems to be missing
in it.46 It is clear from a corresponding passage from Plato’s Statesman
45 See Kraut (2002, 16).
46 The only reason I can read in ranking these constitutions is that the greater the difference
between a correct form and its deviation, the worse this deviation is, cf. Newman (1902, IV. 146).
This explains why Aristotle considers a tyranny as the worst and a democracy as the least bad
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(302c-303b) that Aristotle took this hierarchy from his former master, and I
would suggest that he simply adopted it without thinking through its conse-
quences. For in the Statesman (293c-e), all these constitutions are thought to be
distinct from the ideal one, which is Plato’s variant of the god-like kingship, and
are ranked in a hierarchy, depending on how well they approximate the ideal.
Since a regular, law-abiding kingship is the most similar to its divine variant, it
makes sense that Plato understands it as the best of all six (302e). But in
Aristotle’s hierarchy from Politics IV.2 and Nicomachean Ethics VIII.10, this
seventh constitution is missing, wherefore the Platonic reason why kingship is
thought best, is absent here. The reason why Aristotle nevertheless took this
scheme from his master is that he primarily may have wanted to criticize another
Platonic point.47 This also explains why kingship is presented within these two
passages as the best regime, while elsewhere, as in Politics III.15 (1286b3-7),
Aristotle equally expresses his preference for aristocracy over kingship.
This interpretation therefore fits the argument that Aristotle follows Plato in
many respects, but ultimately disagrees with him on an important point in the
Politics: kingly rule is different from political rule. A regime where an outstand-
ingly virtuous person has eternal and unlimited power as absolute king, is
therefore thought to be an instantiation of the best regime, just as an aristocracy,
but not anymore as instantiation of the rule (to be expected) in a political
community, where the citizens rule in turn. This shows plainly how Aristotle’s
regime. An argument, however, why kingship, as a correct constitution, is ranked higher than
the other correct forms, and especially aristocracy, does not appear in these passages. Aristotle
calls kingship in Politics IV.2 “the first and most divine regime” (ἡ πρώτη καὶ θειοτάτη), but
arguing that it is best because of this character, seems circular. Also in Nicomachean Ethics
VIII.10, this reason seems missing, but suggestions are made to explain it. Richard Kraut, for
instance, thinks that kingship is better, because “when a few share power, ruling is more
difficult, because they must coordinate their plans and make joint decisions”, see Kraut (2002,
424). Aristotle himself, however, argues in Politics III.15 (1286b2-7) that one can suppose equally
virtuous people in an aristocracy, which makes the latter more rather than less preferable, since
multiple rulers are less likely to be corrupted than a single ruler. Another explanation, from
Thornton Lockwood, is that elsewhere in the Ethics the reasons can be found why kingship is
presented here as the best regime, in so far that it is sometimes used herein as a model for the
inculcation of virtue, see Lockwood (2006, 360–363). Although this seems right, it does not, in
my eyes, sufficiently explain why kingship itself is ranked higher than aristocracy. His argu-
ment seems to build upon Vander Waerdt’s thesis that it is for the sake of the subjects, but
earlier in this paper, such an assumption was refuted.
47 Aristotle indicates in Politics IV.2 (1289b5-11) that “someone” (τις) already proposed such a
scheme, but that it was wrong in the supposition that there is a good and bad variant for every
constitution. Aristotle disagrees with him in saying that a constitution as the deviant oligarchy
is simply bad and can only be regarded as less worse than another. That this someone against
whom Aristotle argues is Plato becomes obvious in reading the latter’s Statesman (302d-303b).
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political thought is not only influenced by Plato’s philosophical theories, but by
common Greek practice as well.48
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